We achieved success bringing a couple to the UK. By proving to remove would be a breach of Article 8 "a right to family life". We used case law, visual aids and expert testimony to win at Tribunal.
In the UK we are blessed with freedom of worship. We assisted a family seek asylum in the UK. Through extensive country research, case law and witness statements we assisted freeing a family to worship together peacefully here in the UK
As an adult dependant its difficult to be away from your children who all reside in the UK. We assisted a family to reunite under the Immigration Rules. Using a wealth of documentation we proved that she qualifies to be near her children and grandchildren.
The Supreme Court is asked to consider whether to return AM to Zimbabwe would violate his right under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights not to be subjected to inhuman treatment by reason of his medical condition, in light of the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Paposhvili v Belgium  Imm AR 867.
If. the applicant is “capable of demonstrating that there are substantial grounds for believing” that, if removed, he or she would be exposed to a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to article 3 he could defeat a deportation order.
The US made mutual legal assistance (‘MLA’) request to the UK in relation to an investigation into the activities of alleged Syrian terrorists, Refusing to provide the Home Secretary a full death penalty assurance. The HS agreed to provide the information. This was appealed.
Has the common law evolved to recognise a principle prohibiting the provision of MLA that will facilitate the death penalty? No.
Is it lawful under Part 3 of the DPA to transfer personal data to law enforcement authorities abroad for use in capital criminal proceedings? No.
The Court is permitted to adopt any procedure consistent with the overriding objective, the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 and the Rules (rule 9(7)). The overriding objective is to secure that the Court is accessible, fair and efficient (rule 2(2)). Where an important question of law that may have been decided wrongly below is raised in an appeal, it is open to the Court to permit intervention and allow the intervener to take over the conduct of the appeal.
When determining an appeal as to whether a removal decision would infringe rights under the ECHR, a tribunal must determine the relevant factual issues for itself on the evidence before it, albeit giving due weight to a decision-making authority’s prior determination. It therefore became common ground that a tribunal is not bound by a decision of the NRM nor must it seek a public law ground for finding such a decision flawed.
This appeal is about the law on damages for false imprisonment. It requires the Supreme Court to consider the meaning of imprisonment at common law and whether this should be aligned with the concept of deprivation of liberty under the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2018-0137-press-summary.pdf
A non-member state national (“TCN”) parent of a European Union (“EU”) citizen child resident within the EU is entitled to reside in the EU. This is solely to avoid the EU citizen child being deprived of the substance of their Union citizenship rights on removal of the TCN parent from the EU. The TCN’s derived right of residence is only provided to ensure that the EU citizen’s rights are effective. This limits the entitlement of a TCN to reside in the EU. There must be a “relationship of dependency” between the EU citizen and the TCN.
There is distinction between the case of an EU citizen who is an adult and one who is a child. A TCN can have a relationship of dependency with an adult EU citizen sufficient to justify a derived right of residence only in exceptional circumstances https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2018-0006-press-summary.pdf
five respondents arrived in the United Kingdom illegally and claimed asylum. They had all travelled to the United Kingdom via at least one other member state of the European Union in which they had already claimed asylum. Each of the respondents was detained for a period of time pending his or her removal from the United Kingdom. The respondents challenged the lawfulness of their detention. The Court considered 2 questions firstly, Is there is a “significant risk of absconding”? Secondly, if the detention was not lawful, are damages payable either under domestic law for false (or wrongful) imprisonment, or pursuant to what is known as the Factortame principle. The court individuals are entitled to compensation under domestic law for any loss that the wrongful detention has caused them.
An Italian National was sentenced to 8 years in prison for manslaughter. On release the Home Secretary decided to deport him. The question was asked whether a right of permanent residence (“RPR”) is a prerequisite for enhanced protection against expulsion pursuant to article 28(3)(a) of the Directive. The Court held he had completed more than five years of continuous legal residence in the UK thus acquiring a right of permanent residence. However it had not been granted before the period of imprisonment. Accordingly, the necessary period of five years’ continuous legal residence could not begin any earlier than when he completed the custodial part of his sentence, and five years’ continuous legal residence had not been completed by the time the decision to deport him was made.
The CA held it was beyond Dr Zapata-Bravo’s remit as an expert medical witness to state his opinion that his findings were “highly consistent” with the account of torture as a whole. The Supreme Court held it was beyond Dr Zapata-Bravo’s remit as an expert medical witness to state his opinion that his findings were “highly consistent” with KV’s account of torture as a whole.
However given the serious lack of credibility in several areas, the tribunal was correct to address the possibility of wounding SIPB. However, when the tribunal concluded that there were only two real possibilities – either that KV had been tortured or that the wounding was SIBP – and when it rejected the former, it failed to take into account the fact that self-infliction of wounds is inherently unlikely.
where a person has already had a human rights claim refused and there is no pending appeal, do further submissions that rely on human rights grounds have to be accepted by the Secretary of State as a fresh claim? No, unless there was an appealable decision within the first rejection.